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C ameron L. S affell

•

A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of
Santa Fe

Introduction

H

istorians of New Mexico are familiar with the so-called “bloodless conquest” of Santa Fe in the early months of the U.S.-Mexico
War (1846–1848). In August 1846 the last Mexican governor, Manuel
Armijo, fled ahead of the quickly advancing U.S. Army of the West led by Brig.
Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny. Armijo’s decision allowed the force to enter Santa
Fe completely unopposed with no shots fired. Those who know more details of
the campaign are aware of how James Wiley Magoffin, supposedly the U.S. government’s secret agent who went to Santa Fe ahead of Kearny, convinced—or
perhaps bribed—Armijo into abandoning the capital. In fact, some historians
have argued that Magoffin was the reason why there was a “bloodless conquest.”
The details of this important historical event have become a colorful account
of intrigue, deception, and treachery that could only take place in New Mexico.
In its retelling, the story has become almost mythical. The modern interpretation—relatively similar for at least fifty years—has evolved through a couple of
major iterations, each based on changing perspective and available materials.

Cameron L. Saffell is an Assistant Professor of Museum Science at the Museum of Texas Tech
University and a historian of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century American Southwest. He
was formerly Curator of History at the New Mexico Farm & Ranch Heritage Museum. Dr. Saffell thanks his colleagues Leslie Bergloff and Dr. Rick Hendricks for their input and feedback
on this and other Magoffin research projects. He is particularly indebted to Dr. Hendricks
for translating or correcting Saffell’s Spanish transcriptions of Mexican archival records and
newspaper materials.
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Yet important questions persist. Is the “bloodless conquest” narrative more fictional than historical? Are the facts—or our best understandings of them—
consistent with this version of the story? Or are there irregularities that should
be corrected? Was there a bribe? Were Magoffin and Armijo truly related by
marriage? Was Armijo really a crook who took a payoff to save his own neck?
Or was he a coward struck with fear at the prospect of facing a well-trained military force?
Unlike the famous quote from the fictional movie The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence (1962), “When the legend becomes fact, print the legend,” this article reassesses the details of the predominant “bloodless conquest” narrative of
the last several decades and offers a more factually balanced account.1 First, this
work reviews the evolution of the prevalent interpretation and examines why it
changed. Second, peeling back the layers of secondary accounts to expose the
original writings of people who were directly involved and using both American and Mexican military reports, letters, and recollections the article reexamines the timeline of events and activities of the key players. Third, it challenges
the veracity of primary accounts and exposes their potential for significant bias.
A thorough examination of these materials provides significant insight that
reframes the story of the conquest of Santa Fe.2
The Bloodless Conquest Narrative
The origins of the “bloodless conquest” narrative extend back to almost the
war itself. During and immediately after the conflict newspapers, a few books,
and congressional summaries published various letters and accounts of the
U.S.-Mexico War. In 1856, however, a new and important voice added to the dialogue. From 1821 to 1851 Thomas Hart Benton served as Missouri’s first U.S. senator, where he was an ardent supporter of westward expansion, settlement, and
trade. He was very interested in exploring and understanding what became the
western United States and the trade that emanated from his home state to Mexico along the Santa Fe Trail. For many years he chaired the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs, which became critically important during the U.S.-Mexico
War and made Benton a crucial advisor to Pres. James K. Polk.3
After Benton’s defeat in the senatorial election of 1850, he began working
on his memoirs, Thirty Years’ View; Or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850. Having served over three
decades, his views and opinions were—and still are—highly valued observations of early nineteenth-century U.S. government affairs. When it came to the
war, however, Benton specifically did not want to write a history of those events,
stating that his work “does not write of military events, open to public history,
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but only of things less known, and to show how they were done: and in this
point of view the easy and bloodless conquest of New Mexico [emphasis added],
against such formidable obstacles, becomes an exception, and presents a proper
problem for intimate historical solution.”4 With that statement, Benton christened a behind-the-scenes story of Kearny’s capture of Santa Fe. Benton’s subsequent account became the foundational narrative for historians, one rarely
questioned for decades.
Benton painted a story around a genuine character: James Wiley Magoffin, a
“man of mind, of will, of generous temper, patriotic, and rich” who knew every
man in New Mexico and much of the rest of the country. Benton introduced
Magoffin to Polk, who engaged Magoffin’s services as a U.S. emissary. Magoffin
knew how to manipulate and convince officials, particularly New Mexico’s governor, Armijo, to avoid a fight and concede to the U.S. Army that was advancing
on the region. Benton argued that Magoffin engaged in these activities at great
personal risk and cost, as he was subsequently arrested and imprisoned in Mexico. After his release and return to Washington, Magoffin requested that he be
reimbursed for his expenses and financial losses. Benton championed him and
eventually convinced Washington officialdom to pay Magoffin. Benton felt that
the bloodless conquest could not have been effected if not for Magoffin.5
This story was not just a colorful anecdote in Benton’s memoirs. Several years
earlier he had written to historian Benson John Lossing about the campaign:
As you aspire to the character of an informed, as well as a veracious
historian, I can put you upon the track to give an inside view of the
“bloodless conquest” of New Mexico, so boasted by all the official and
semi-official accounts. The fact was that [the] ‘bloodless conquest’ was
arranged by Mr. James Magoffin . . . . I expect I can get you a copy of all
the papers from Magoffin[’s claims], tho [sic] he might not wish to have
every thing [Benton’s emphasis] told which he did, and how he did; but
I myself am privy to the whole from the beginning to the ending, and
instrumental in the first employment and final payment of Magoffin.6
One cannot say for sure whether Benton coined the phrase “bloodless conquest
of Santa Fe” (or of New Mexico). Historian John Stillwell Jenkins used the same
phrase in one of the first accounts of the war published in 1849, the same year
as Benton’s letter.7 Indeed, it may have been Kearny himself who first suggested
the bloodless conquest, although not in those exact words, in his “Proclamation to the Inhabitants of New Mexico.” Issued on 22 August 1846, Kearny stated
“Don Manuel Armijo, the late governor of this department, has fled from it: the
undersigned [Kearny] has taken possession of it without firing a gun or spilling a drop of blood.”8 Whatever the origins, Benton certainly capitalized on the
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phrase in publicizing his personal efforts, and those of Magoffin, in the successful military campaign.
For many years little information challenged Benton’s baseline narrative.
The only other direct witness, Capt. Philip St. George Cooke, who took Kearny’s message and Magoffin to Armijo, did not publish his account until 1878.
Magoffin’s documentation regarding his expenses did not come to light until
after 1900. Hubert Howe Bancroft, in his history of Arizona and New Mexico
published in 1889, relied greatly on Benton’s account but acknowledged in a
footnote, “There may be no reason to question the general accuracy of Benton’s
version, or to doubt that Magoffin really obtained these promises . . . . It is probable that there is much exaggeration in the implied opinion that the U.S. relied
mainly on, or that Kearny’s successes were due mainly to, M[agoffin]’s negotiations at this time. M[agoffin]’s efforts were rather the supplement or conclusion
to a long chain of investigations and negotiations by himself and others.”9
Revised Interpretations Surrounding the Bloodless Conquest
When all of Magoffin’s claim documents for his time and expenses became
available to historians such as W. E. Connelley, Stella Drumm, and Ralph Emerson Twitchell in the 1910s and early 1920s, the narrative of bloodless conquest
began to change. Magoffin still played his part as the central character and key
reason for success, but historians added some additional details to flesh out
the story. In the revised narrative, Magoffin reached Armijo because the governor was related to Magoffin’s wife, and Armijo had likely accepted a bribe
from Magoffin to flee New Mexico. With accounts published by these historians between the 1910s and the 1930s, the new history of the bloodless conquest
became entrenched, and this interpretation is still utilized to this day.10
Douglas Comer, in his book published in 1996 about Bent’s Fort and the
annexation of the Southwest, provides a rather typical and modern description:
“Armijo and Magoffin were not strangers. Magoffin had married a high-born
New Mexico woman and was Armijo’s ‘cousin by marriage.’ Whether money
was given to Armijo as part of the agreement reached is unclear—but certainly
Armijo’s dealings with the Americans had resulted in personal financial gains
for him in the past.”11 Historians in the last twenty years have so frequently
(about a dozen times in books alone, not counting numerous articles) repeated
the suggestion that Armijo was Maria Gertrudis Valdés Magoffin’s cousin that it
is commonly taken as fact.12
Yet questions remain: Were Magoffin and Armijo actually related and was
this really the basis for their relationship? An analysis that compares the genealogies of Manuel Armijo and Maria Gertrudis Valdés Magoffin answers these
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questions. Armijo biographer Janet Lecompte drafted a narrative genealogy of his family in the 1970s by utilizing Fray Angélico Chávez’s The Origins of New Mexico Families. Lecompte had the primary goal of debunking
the myth that Armijo came from disreputable parents and did not make his
wealth from stealing sheep.13 Further digging in Origins of New Mexico Families,
however, permits the construction of a nearly complete five-generation pedigree chart (fig. 1). The only ancestors not identifiable by name are a paternal
great-great-grandfather, whom Chávez identifies only as an Indian father, and
two maternal great-great-grandmothers. Everyone in the first four generations lived in the Albuquerque or Santa Fe areas, and many of those in the fifth
generation were either families displaced by the Pueblo Revolt or individuals
born in Zacatecas in the 1600s. Clearly, Armijo’s family had strong ties to Nuevo
México extending back to the Spanish Reconquest period.14
Unfortunately no resource such as Origins of New Mexico Families exists to
research the genealogy of María Gertrudis Valdés Magoffin. However, Rick Hendricks, Leslie Bergloff, and I have developed a similar five-generation genealogy
for Mrs. Magoffin (fig. 2). María Gertrudis de los Santos Valdés was born in 1806
in San Fernando de Bexár (San Antonio). She was indeed related to a Mexican
governor, but not Manuel Armijo. Rather, her relative was Juan Martín del Carmen de Veramendi, governor of Coahuila y Tejas in the early 1830s. He was Maria’s
half-uncle (they had the same grandmother but different grandfathers). Maria’s
maternal line is very well defined, going back to two great-grandparents born in
Spain (their respective parents unknown) and two sets of great-great grandparents
tied to the Canary Island families who settled San Antonio in the 1730s. Her paternal line is only defined through her grandparents, who appear to have either
been from or lived in the Monclova area of Coahuila in the mid-1700s. Likewise,
Maria’s mother and her parents (the Amondarains) had strong ties to Monclova
or nearby Saltillo. This genealogy shows her family to be well ensconced in the
Texas/Coahuila region of New Spain to at least the mid-1700s, with her known
relatives traced back to Spain itself in the early 1700s.15
Although no firm records exist about the paternal Valdés line prior to 1770,
the likelihood is extremely low that Manuel Armijo was related to Maria Gertrudis Valdés Magoffin. Essentially, there are no early Valdés ancestors who could
fall into the Armijo family line because the Armijos were in either New Mexico
or late seventeenth-century Zacatecas whereas the Valdés/Amondarains were in
either Coahuila or early eighteenth-century Spain. Indeed, if they had a common ancestor they would have been at least third cousins, and in that hypothetical case would have unlikely known anything of each other, having grown up
some eight hundred miles apart on different caminos reales. Armijo and Valdés
were more than likely not related to each other and therefore this “relationship”
Saffell / A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of Santa Fe
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Manuel Armijo
(1790, Belen Parish–1854, Lemitar)

Bárbara Casilda
Durán y Chávez
(1755–?)

Vicente Ferrer
Armijo (1735–aft
1769)

Juana Silva (mid–1710s,
Santa Cruz – aft 1755)

Diego Antonio Durán y
Chaves (1723, Albuquerque – ?)

Francisca Alfonsa Lucero
de Godoy (?–aft 1764)

Salvador Manuel de Armijo
(?–1764, Albuquerque)

Fig. 1 Six-generation pedigree genealogy of Manuel Armijo

Gergoria Ruiz (1671,
Mexico City–1736,
Albuquerque)

Antonio de Silva
(1670, Queretaro–1732,
Albuquerque)

Juana Montoya (?–bef
1728)

Pedro Durán y Chaves
(bef 1680–1735)
Founder of
Albuquerque

Isabel Lujan
(?–1771, Santa Fe)

Juan Lucero
(?–1741, Santa Fe)

Maria de Apodaca
(1680s–aft 1743)

Vicente Ferrer Durán y
Armijo (1684–1743)
b. Zacatecas, d. Nambé

[Unknown]

Juan Ruiz

[Unknown]

Savalador de Silva
(resid of Queretaro, Mex.)

Diego Montoya
immigr to Santa Fe, 1693
Josefa de Hinojos

Lucia Hurtado de Salas
(?, New Mexico–1729)

Don Fernando Durán y
Chaves II (1651–1712/16)
Only Chaves w/ Reconquest

Pedro Lujan (1666–aft 1693)
b. New Mexico
Francisca Marin de Salazar
returned w/ Reconquest

Antonia Varela de Pera
(de Losada)

Antonio Lucero de Godoy
(1650/55, New Mex – bef
1712)

Indian father
Juana de Apodaca

Catalina Durån (? – aft 1706)

Jose de Armijo (? – bef 1706)
came to New Mexico 1695
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Maria Valdés Magoffin
(1806, San Fernando de Béxar–
1845, Independence, Mo.)

Maria Josefa Amondarain
(1786 – 1833, Monclova,
Coahuila)

Tomás Valdes de Casteñada
(1785, Valle de Santa Rosa,
Coahuila–1825, Monclova,
Coahuila)

María Josefa de la Encarnacion
Granados
(1759, San Fernando de Béxar –
1787, San Fernando de Béxar)

Juan Martín de Amondarain
(1760, Elduayen, Spain – 1802,
Saltillo, Coahuila)

Maria Casteñada
(?–aft 1808)

Francisco Valdés (?, Monclova
–bef 1808, Coahuila)

Fig. 2 Six-generation pedigree genealogy of Maria Gertrudis de los Santos Valdés Magoffin.

Maria Isabel de
Castro
(1738? – 1799)

Juan de Acuña
Rodríguez
Granado (1730,
Quatitlán, Mex. –
1782, San Fernando
de Béxar)

Mari Manuel
Anciola
resident of Spain

Juan Antonio
Amondarain
resident of Spain

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

Maria Hernandez
(17?? – 1769)

Miguel de Castro–Valdez
(1726 – 1756)

14th family of the Canary
Island settlers of San Antonio
Maria Robaina de Betancour
(1703, Lancerote, Canary
Island – 1779)

Juan Rodríguez Granadillo (1700 – 1730,
Veracruz)

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

[Unknown]

could not have been the basis for the familial connection between James Wiley
Magoffin and Armijo suggested by some historians of the U.S.-Mexico War.
What then has made this error so pervasive? The suggestion that Armijo and
Valdés were related can be traced back to a letter written by Robert B. McAfee
to the secretary of war, William Marcy, while Magoffin was still imprisoned
in Chihuahua. With the death a few years prior of former Kentucky governor Isaac Shelby (grandfather of the diarist Susan Magoffin) McAfee was the
most-prominent politician of the greater Magoffin-Shelby-McAfee families of
Mercer County, Kentucky. McAfee, who was first cousin to James Wiley Magoffin’s mother, had served as a general in the War of 1812 and Andrew Jackson later
appointed him as Chargé d’affaires to New Granada (Colombia) in the 1830s.16
McAfee’s letter of June 1847 sought assistance from U.S. government officials to direct Gen. Zachary Taylor to intervene for Magoffin’s safety and release.
McAfee described his understanding of the situation: “He was taken prisoner
near Chihuahua last fall and condemned to be shot as a Mexican traitor having
lived in that place as a merchant and was returning to Chihuahua to look after
his affairs from Santa Fe, having been of essential service to General Kearny was
in advance of him on his march to California. His sentence was suspended at
the request of Governor Armijo, his wife being his relation [emphasis added].”17
No obvious reason exists for why McAfee believed María Gertrudis Valdés to be
a relative of Armijo. In fact she had died in 1845, just a couple of months after
coming from Chihuahua to Missouri with James Wiley Magoffin and their family. Thus, it is all but certain that McAfee never met her, and McAfee’s contact
with Magoffin would have been limited to Magoffin’s infrequent visits or correspondence with his family in Mercer County.18 McAfee offered the statement
nonetheless, perhaps to justify Armijo’s intervention in Magoffin’s case.
Likewise, what or even how McAfee knew about Magoffin’s imprisonment
remains unclear. He did not glean the information from Samuel and Susan
Magoffin, who did not return from Mexico (via ship) until late 1847, and it is
unclear when or how brother William Magoffin, who also was part of the same
trading trip, got home to Kentucky. Although family correspondence provides
a possible source for McAfee’s information, McAfee could possibly have been
reacting to newspaper accounts, although none have been located that mention
Armijo’s intervention.19
McAfee’s letter was among documents published by W. E. Connelley and R.
E. Twitchell in 1918 and 1923, respectively, and it became the basis for the fundamental shift in the narrative that Magoffin and Armijo had a familial connection. That said, McAfee clearly did not describe how Armijo and Valdés were
related—just that they were. The question then becomes: What is the source of
that particular detail?
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Investigating footnotes, the source of the cousin relationship appears to be
Howard R. Lamar. In 1962 he wrote a foreword to a new Yale Western Americana Paperbound reprint of Susan Shelby Magoffin’s diary, Down the Santa Fe
Trail and Into Mexico, which Stella Drumm originally edited and published in
1926. The foreword provides the larger context of Kearny’s Santa Fe campaign
and the prominent role played by James Wiley Magoffin in which to understand Susan’s perspectives in her diary. Susan herself had no direct knowledge
of these events, as she and Samuel arrived in Santa Fe almost two weeks after
Kearny.20 Lamar offered details in two parts of the foreword, the first describing the Magoffin-Valdés marriage: “In 1830 James further entrenched himself in
the economic and social life of the northern provinces by marrying Dona Maria
Gertrudes Valdez de Beremende, who came from a prominent Chihuahua family. Her brother, Gabriel Valdez, was also a Mexican trader on the Santa Fe Trail,
and her cousin, Manuel Armijo, was a rich, self-made merchant from Albuquerque who was soon to be governor of New Mexico [emphasis added].”21 Lamar
repeated this suggestion of the family connection a few pages later in describing
the advance work by Magoffin and Cooke:
There [at Bent’s Fort], after consultation, Kearny appears to have fallen
in with Magoffin’s plans, for on August 1 he detailed Captain Philip St.
George Cook[e] to take twelve men to accompany Magoffin to Santa Fe
under a flag of truce and to negotiate with the Governor, General Manuel Armijo. When the small party arrived in the enemy capital twelve
days later, Magoffin acted as if he were merely a merchant riding under
Cooke’s protection. But long after the guards and officials had gone to
bed and left the Palace of the Governors in darkness, Magoffin brought
Armijo, who was his cousin by marriage, to Cooke’s chambers for secret
conferences [emphasis added].22
Texas Western College historian Rex Strickland promptly pointed out this
“cousin relative” error. In his review of the book for Southwestern Historical
Quarterly, Strickland writes, “Lamar has fallen into the tired, old error concerning the identity of James Magoffin’s wife.” Although Strickland mainly criticizes the reference to Valdés being a Veramendi from Chihuahua (the link to
her half-uncle who was governor of Coahuila y Tejas), Strickland’s explanation
makes Valdés’s Texas roots clear and, by implication, the lack of a connection to
Armijo or New Mexico.23
Accepting a family connection—an interpretation that itself only dates back
to the 1920s—as the primary reason why Magoffin could have so easily reached
Armijo bypasses the more reasonable and direct explanation: the two men had
already known each other for years. Re-reading Lamar’s statement, he identifies
Saffell / A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of Santa Fe
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this more-probable explanation: “Manuel Armijo, was a rich, self-made merchant from Albuquerque who was soon to be governor of New Mexico” [emphasis added]. In fact, Armijo’s brothers had wagons in the trade caravan following
the U.S. Army. Armijo was himself a merchant by the late 1820s, and involved
in the Santa Fe and Chihuahua Trails trade. By 1832 Magoffin had shifted his
operations to the same routes.24 In addition, during his three terms as governor Armijo had oversight of collecting customs duties from traders when they
arrived in New Mexico. Not only did Armijo and Magoffin know each other,
they also were probably friends.25
Portrayals of Manuel Armijo
Almost all accounts depict New Mexico’s governor Manuel Armijo as a heartless despot who fled danger to protect himself and his wealth. Historians Daniel Tyler, Janet Lecompte, and most recently Paul Kraemer have demonstrated
that Armijo’s reputation is largely based on two factors: the written descriptions of Armijo by George Kendall of the New Orleans (La.) Picayune newspaper after the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition in 1841; and Armijo’s abandonment of
Santa Fe in the late hours of 14 August 1846, which led a señora (lady) who visited Susan Magoffin a few days later to call Armijo a ladrón (thief) and a coward. As Kraemer’s article title of 2011 denotes, Armijo’s reputation needs major
rehabilitation.26
A reassessment of Armijo—and by extension the role Magoffin played in the
“bloodless conquest”—first requires an examination of the contemporary Mexican records. Several months after these events, Armijo was tried in Mexico City
on charges related to cowardice and desertion.27 Several files in Mexico’s Archivo
Histórico Militar hold depositions and information about the trial. Only in a
couple of instances have historians consulted these documents, much less compared them to U.S. accounts to improve the historical understanding of the
events.28
The Mexican military’s summary folder regarding Armijo and his withdrawal from Santa Fe includes accounts of what transpired from three Mexican men. Pío Sambrano, a merchant from Chihuahua who had arrived in Santa
Fe at the beginning of August, offered some general information. The Santa Fe
presidial captain, Ignacio Muñoz, and one of his lieutenants, Manuel García de
Lara, gave further details. Their information is very consistent with the only
American eyewitness account, provided by Philip St. George Cooke in his autobiographical account published in 1878.29
On 2 August, Cooke, twelve men handpicked from his unit, and merchants
James Wiley Magoffin and Juan González set out from near Bent’s Fort for Santa
286
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Fe. Kearny had made Cooke aware of Magoffin’s role as dictated by Marcy, and
Kearny sent with Cooke a letter to Armijo. The journey took ten days. Cooke,
who suffered food poisoning from a turtle soup prepared the evening of 10
August by Magoffin’s cook, was temporarily separated from the merchants and
his men, so Magoffin and González entered Santa Fe the next day ahead of
Cooke. Muñoz and García de Lara both stated that Magoffin went directly to
Armijo’s home for what became the first of several meetings over the next couple of days.30
Cooke’s arrival on 12 August merited great attention from the community.
The cries of alarm caused him enough concern to stop and affix a white handkerchief to his sword as a flag of truce. He was immediately directed to the Palace of the Governors, where he dismounted and was shown inside. Though
Cooke does not mention it, Muñoz says that Magoffin was at the Palace to greet
him and made the formal introduction of Cooke to Governor Armijo. Speaking
in “very formal book-Spanish,” Cooke told Armijo of his mission and offered to
present the letter from Kearny, but Cooke and Muñoz both stated that Armijo
stopped him and instead invited Cooke to settle into the quarters that had been
prepared for him. Cooke wrote that almost immediately U.S. merchants bearing
chocolate, cake, and whiskey visited him at his room.31
From there the accounts differ in detail but agree in general context. Cooke
saw Armijo, Magoffin, and others on at least two more occasions during the
afternoon and evening, later writing that Armijo asked many questions about
Kearny and his rank and the speed with which the Army had marched, which
Cooke thought was proffered to judge the strength of the force. Cooke suggests
that in the evening a large dinner took place at the Palace, although Muñoz’s
account has the dinner taking place at the home of José González Ortega. At
whichever location, a grand meal was served, although Cooke, who was still
suffering from the food poisoning two evenings prior, generally abstained from
the meal. Muñoz indicated that American merchant Henry Connelly and the
Spanish-born U.S. consul Manuel Alvarez were among those at the dinner.
Cooke offers no details of what was said, but Muñoz stated that a lengthy conversation took place, all in Spanish until someone entered who did not know
the language. A short time later, according to Muñoz, many of the group left for
Armijo’s house.32
Cooke said that at about 10 p.m. Armijo approached him with Magoffin, but
it is unclear where this took place. Armijo told Cooke he had decided to send a
commissioner back with Cooke to carry Armijo’s response to Kearny and that
they should leave the next morning (Thursday 13 August). Armijo also promised that he would be marching the next day with a force of six thousand.33
Muñoz and García de Lara were not privy to these details, but they suggested
Saffell / A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of Santa Fe
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that Magoffin and Connelly secretly met with Armijo as many as five times.
García de Lara reported that Magoffin had said the Mexican residents would
be happy with the United States because their property would be respected,
their homes would be worth more, and that the system of government would be
much improved. García de Lara also recounted that he later spoke with Armijo,
who confirmed to García de Lara that Magoffin had been commissioned a colonel and that Magoffin had made similar comments to Armijo about wealth and
prosperity.34
Magoffin himself reported on one of these meetings without Cooke, a story
independently confirmed by Pío Sambrano. Magoffin and Armijo met with
the governor’s second-in-command, Diego Archuleta. In this meeting Magoffin suggested that the United States was only interested in the eastern side of
the Rio Grande and that Archuleta could remain to oversee the western part of
Nuevo México as a continuing Mexican state. Sambrano said that it was Armijo
who suggested that they not offer any resistance. Both Magoffin and Sambrano
wrote that Archuleta was initially enthusiastic about this plan, although Sambrano said he later became indifferent and Magoffin suggested that Archuleta
changed his mind in favor of resistance.35
On the morning of Thursday 13 August, Cooke recalled that he met with
Armijo for a final time (either at the Palace of the Governors or at Armijo’s private residence) and was treated to an array of chocolate, cake, and bread “such
as only Mexicans or Spaniards can make.” He was soon joined by Armijo’s commissioner, who turned out to be Connelly. Muñoz offered a different take on
this day’s events. He indicated that Cooke, Connelly, Magoffin, and two other
men left Santa Fe, but not before a large picnic hosted by several foreigners, as
well as Chihuahua trader and Magoffin’s friend José Cordero. Toasts were given
to a prosperous future, which Muñoz and other observers found to be highly
suspicious. Cooke said that his parting words, spoken from the saddle as a general statement offered in English, were “I’ll call again in a week.” On Saturday 15
August Cooke rejoined Kearny and the U.S. Army, but offered no observations
about the general’s reaction to Connelly or Armijo’s letter.36
Was a Bribe Paid?
None of the primary accounts, including those of the key players involved,
mention any kind of bribery. Nevertheless, secondary historical accounts often
include the suggestion that Armijo took a bribe to abandon Santa Fe—most
often expressed as one that Magoffin paid. Yet there is virtually no basis for
this interpretation. Some historians point to Magoffin’s itemized summary of
his expenses that he submitted to Sec. of War George Crawford in April 1849
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as their source. However, upon closer examination Magoffin specified the
bribes involved. The first was $3,800 paid “in order to extricate from the military judge, Gen. Kearny’s written statement of my services in Santafe [sic], New
Mexico, directed to the Secretary of War, Washington.” He then listed two items,
not explicitly stated as bribes but taken that way by Crawford: $1,100 paid to
the auditor of war for Durango, Mexico, for his release from prison; and an
additional $500 paid to a Mexican friend to make the arrangements with the
auditor.37 Magoffin makes no mention of any payment to Armijo, either in his
itemized expenses or in his initial letter to Marcy written ten days after the U.S.
Army arrived in Santa Fe. Likewise, Cooke includes no reference to any gold or
a bribe in his autobiographical account.38
Is there any other evidence to suggest a bribe was paid, and was Magoffin
involved? The answer is yes and no. The testimony of Donaciano Vigil, who
was said to have evidence proving Armijo sold New Mexico to the United
States, helps answer these questions. The materials from the Archivo de Defensa
Nacional on “Formación de causa al General Manuel Armijo” (For the Prosecution of General Manuel Armijo) contain a letter, written in June 1847, from José
Maria Árlegui to Ángel Trías, the Chihuahua governor who faced off with Col.
Alexander Doniphan in the Battle of Sacramento in February 1847. This source
has Vigil stating that an El Paso laborer testified that a man named “Espayer”
delivered 24,000 pesos in cash money to Armijo, followed later by “five hundred ounces of gold brought by Captain Lisa with eleven men assisting who
entered before the forces.”39 Vigil would likely have been in a position to know
of what he spoke. He had served as Armijo’s provincial secretary in the past, and
Kearny designated him the first secretary for the Territorial government under
Gov. Charles Bent. Vigil became acting governor when Bent was killed in the
Taos Rebellion in December 1846.40 Another version of this testimony attributes
the gold delivery to “Capitan Cuco.” With an average market price during that
period of $18.93 per ounce and an official U.S. government price of $20.67 per
troy ounce, the gold alone would have been valued around $10,000; with an
approximate one peso-to-the-dollar currency exchange, the total “bribe” would
be the equivalent of about $900,000 in today’s money.41
Whatever evidence Vigil refers to has never surfaced, although as Armijo’s
territorial secretary he would likely have been in a position to know whether
any money changed hands. “Espayer” refers to Albert Speyer, a merchant-trader
who frequently partnered with Armijo. In fact in 1846 Speyer and a second
group of wagons owned by Armijo left for Santa Fe well ahead of the usual summer caravan. Both groups carried arms and ammunition, Armijo’s for his use
and Speyer’s for the governor of Chihuahua. Hearing of these reports, Kearny
had sent an army unit to chase down the Speyer/Armijo wagons in June, but
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the group quickly made it to Santa Fe without the army overtaking them. Once
there, and learning of the pending advance of U.S. troops down the Santa Fe
Trail, Armijo decided to sell his goods to Speyer. Thus, Speyer did indeed
pay Armijo some amount of money—but apparently it was a legal business
transaction.42
The conflicting references from the two copies of the testimony on who
delivered the gold adds a different wrinkle to the story. Neither the Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point, N.Y., nor the index of soldiers documented in the Mexican War service records include a “Lisa,” “Leisa,” “Lesa,” “Leesa,” or any other close variants.43 Name aside, the description of the captain assisted by eleven men almost
exactly matches Cooke and his twelve dragoons (omitting Magoffin and Gonzales). Arguably “Captain Cuco” is a rendering of Captain Cooke.
Another source suggests a bribe was paid and corroborates the assertion
attributed to Vigil. Philip St. George Cooke III, writing in the preface to a reprint
in 1964 of his great-grandfather’s book, states that Cooke did not write “that he
was the only officer on the frontier that the government would trust with the
large sum of gold used to bribe Armijo to leave Santa Fe and New Mexico without fighting the forces of the United States Army.” Cooke III provides no source
for the information, and it is the only time in the many books by or about the
Cooke family that this suggestion is offered—probably it is family folklore.44
Several conclusions result from investigating these sources for proof of a
bribe. First, no evidence exists that Magoffin offered or paid a bribe. No primary
sources attribute anything of this nature to him. Second, the accounts by Vigil
and Cooke III provide a weak and murky suggestion that the U.S. military—
by way of Captain Cooke—carried bribe money. This premise seems highly
unlikely, however, and Cooke himself never mentions such a transaction in any
of his writing. None of the military orders from the War Department to Kearny
and in turn from Kearny to Cooke reference gold or any other account of a payoff. No accounts by rank-and-file members of the Kearny forces published at
the time or in years since mention a large cache of gold carried by the column,
and someone likely would have noted 500 ounces of gold in his letters home or
in personal diary entries. Thus, sources do not substantiate the case that Armijo
was paid a bribe.
Accounts of Armijo’s Withdrawal from Santa Fe
After Cooke departed to return to Kearny and the Army of the West, Armijo
feverishly prepared to defend Santa Fe. According to both Armijo’s and local residents’ accounts, men continued to gather in the village in response to Armijo’s
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appeal of 8 August 1846. By 14 August approximately eighteen hundred men had
gathered in Santa Fe. Armijo also took a few minutes to write a new will—actions
suggesting that he intended to lead his troops in battle in the near future.45 The
next day he ordered these men, assembled as auxiliary units, to march from
Santa Fe and begin taking up a position in Cañon del Apache (called Cañon
de Pecos in some accounts) just west of modern-day Glorieta, New Mexico.
Armijo went out to join them on 16 August with his regular troops, a group of
about two hundred men. He later reported to the Ministro de Guerra y Marina
(Minister of War and the Navy) that although he had a significant number of
men formed in regular and auxiliary companies, only a few of the citizens were
armed and everyone lacked munitions.46
The person lost in all these accounts is the story’s original hero: James Wiley
Magoffin. From the time Cooke left Santa Fe on 13 August until his sister-in-law
Susan Magoffin arrived on 30 August, hardly any source mentions him or
describes his actions. Perhaps he continued to meet with Armijo, Archuleta, or
others in attempts to dissuade the Mexicans from resisting the U.S. forces. The
only time Magoffin appears in his own letter to Marcy dated 26 August. Providing only a few details, Magoffin simply writes that Armijo’s second-in-command,
Archuleta, had assured Magoffin that he would not oppose Kearny’s arrival.
Magoffin added that on the day before the withdrawal, Armijo had issued orders
to fortify the road through the mountain pass with what Magoffin thought was
three thousand men.47
After Armijo reached Apache Canyon on the afternoon of 16 August he convened one or more meetings of the military leaders and some individuals from
Santa Fe, perhaps even including members of the legislative assembly. Up to this
point, all the Mexican accounts of Armijo’s actions generally correspond. What
happened in those meetings, however, is a key point of dispute.
Armijo later said that he initiated the meeting of officers and influential citizens and attempted to rally the troops, appealing to their Mexican patriotism. He
stated he already knew that the auxiliaries lacked the desire to fight, an opinion
affirmed by their captains. Lacking provisions and munitions they did not want to
pointlessly sacrifice themselves. After the meeting, Armijo reported that the auxiliary units left, leaving him behind with his regular force of two hundred men.
The presidial officers decided that the best course was to withdraw south to join
the forces of Col. Maurice Ugarte, thought to be moving north from Chihuahua.
Overnight, according to Armijo, most of the regulars deserted.48
One independent account supports Armijo, a note attributed to Aniceto Abeytia by historian Benjamin Read. Guerra Mexico-Americana (1910) contains an
author’s footnote saying that “en honor á la verdad” (in all honesty) after Read
had finished writing about Armijo as a traitor that Read had spoken with AbeySaffell / A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of Santa Fe
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tia, who told him that after a careful discussion of the officers Armijo withdrew
because of the lack of men and ammunition, thus avoiding unnecessary bloodshed. Abeytia, then fifteen years old and later a lieutenant with the New Mexico
Infantry in the American Civil War, told Read he was present at the meeting.49
The citizens of Santa Fe tell a different story. A group of one-hundred-and-five
men submitted their account of events to the “President of Mexico,” Antonio
López de Santa Anna, on 26 September 1846. According to the citizens, a group
of four thousand Mexican men (all mounted, armed, and carrying as much
ammunition as they could acquire on their own) arrived in Santa Fe to defend
New Mexico. When Armijo and the dragoons arrived in Apache Canyon on
16 August and he met with the militia officers, only one man spoke. That man
stated that the militia had been gathered to fight and that it was their wish and
desire to do so. “His Excellency [Armijo] then replied that he would not risk facing battle with people lacking military training, and that he would do whatever
seemed fitting to him and with his [regular] troops. After that he ordered them
[the militia and civilians] to return to their homes.” Then, in a meeting with the
regular soldiers, Armijo reportedly told the men that they would advance from
their position to battle the U.S. Army. The troops responded enthusiastically,
“but as soon as the citizenry retired, instead of advancing he and the dragoons
and artillery retreated.”50
The citizenry’s version of events has some secondhand support. Don Nicolas Pino told historian Ralph E. Twitchell that at the officers’ meeting Archuleta
wanted to stand and fight, and several officers openly suggested that Armijo
should be assassinated. Later, feeling cheated by Magoffin’s promise that Mexico
would retain the lands west of the Rio Grande, Archuleta later participated in
Mexican efforts to overthrow Gen. Sterling Price at Santa Fe and in the killing of
Gov. Charles Bent during the Taos Rebellion.51
Rafael Chacón provides another account. Then a thirteen-year-old at the
military school, Armijo ordered the cadet into service to command a light artillery unit. When Chacón wrote his memoirs in 1906 he did not recall any meeting occurring. All he remembered was that “all of a sudden Armijo ordered all
the men to go back to their homes, saying that he would go to the front with the
regular companies and the squadron of Vera Cruz.” That night, Chacón was led
back to Santa Fe by his father (a judge and possibly the leader of the Santa Fe
militia) and sent to stay with an aunt in Chamisal. Thus, he was unaware of what
became of Armijo and the regulars.52
Colonel Ugarte, coming north from Chihuahua with additional Mexican
troops to support Armijo, gave a more diplomatic description of the events. He
described the meeting between the chiefs of the auxiliary forces and Armijo as
a dispute over various opinions about the defense, stating “The result was the
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forces were disbanded to their homes, and the general retired with the soldiers
and artillerymen to Galisteo. The presidial soldiers abandoned him, and after
spiking seven artillery pieces, [Armijo] entered the Sierra del Manzano with
only sixty men from the 2nd and 3rd Permanent Cavalry.”53
For his part, Magoffin—who likely was not present for any of these events—
told Marcy that at the meeting Armijo’s officers were not prepared “to defend the
territory” and were willing to accept Kearny’s word that all would be protected.
“Armijo, apparently [Magoffin’s emphasis], appeared very much exasperated” and
ordered the militia to disperse. He left for Chihuahua with about one hundred
dragoons, “maltreating all good citizens on his route.” One might infer from reading the full letter that Magoffin was as surprised as anyone that Armijo gave up.54
At some point during the day, after his arrival in the canyon, Armijo again
wrote to Kearny. In the three-page letter, perhaps laying out an argument for
his superiors more so than for Kearny, Armijo briefly wrote about the lengths
he had gone to defend Nuevo México: “We all know that we should defend our
country and we want to defend it, but we cannot because our central government is hundreds of leagues away, and it is impossible for me to receive the necessary assistance to do so in time.”55 He pronounced his intention to withdraw
to the west bank of the Rio Grande, a location that if Magoffin’s assertions were
true, would not be claimed by the United States. Armijo explained, “I am not
handing over the Department to you [Kearny], and I only have begun a military
withdrawal until I receive orders from my government, to whom I am reporting
everything that has happened.” According to novelist Paul Horgan, Armijo gave
the letter to his second-in-command for delivery. No American accounts mention whether this final letter was ever received by Kearny.56
By the morning of 17 August, Armijo found himself with sixty dragoons,
three artillery pieces, a howitzer, and very little in the way of supplies. Writing
to Ugarte from Manzano, Armijo said these men “were the only troops of this
department of New Mexico who have been willing to follow me until we meet
with troops of the supreme government.”57 He withdrew south via the Manzano
Mountains and the Plain of Las Gallinas, burying the artillery pieces between
Galisteo and Cerrillos because dragging them along was only slowing their
march. Although no one documented it, presumably Armijo crossed the pass
south of the Manzano Mountains and forded the Rio Grande somewhere near
Socorro on his way to El Paso del Norte in hopes of locating Ugarte.58
Did Armijo Abandon His Post? Was He a Coward?
These accounts raise the question of whether or not Armijo was struck by
cowardice. Many contemporary descriptions certainly depicted Armijo as
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a coward. English adventurer George Ruxton wrote in his diary of Armijo’s
“shameful cowardice in surrendering Santa Fé to the Americans without a show
of resistance.” John Hughes, traveling with Col. Alexander Doniphan a couple
of weeks later, told of an encounter with a resident of Algodones (about forty
miles southwest of Santa Fe), who labeled Armijo a damned rascal who had
“gone to the devil.” U.S. soldier George Gibson wrote that “Armijo gets curses
on all sides for cowardice and his tyranny” from the locals as they entered Santa
Fe.59 The citizens of Santa Fe made very harsh comments about Armijo in their
letter to President Santa Anna:
On retiring from the field on orders from Sr. Armijo, [the people] were
publicly insulted with the epithet of cowards by this same gentleman after
they had rallied to him in compliance with their duty and desire. . . . He
ignored the good and constant services of these old troops of the Mexican Republic who had given no cause for being treated in such a manner.
He then abandoned the artillery and took with him about thirty or forty
dragoons . . . apparently those whom he deemed necessary for an escort
through the deserted terrain which he crossed in his shameless flight.60
They went on to state that a military withdrawal might have been more proper:
“It would have saved his military reputation and in some measure covered his
responsibility.” Although the citizens did not know if the Mexicans could have
been victorious, “at least we would have had the honor of having tried. Nothing,
absolutely nothing was done. And Sr. Armijo can say full well: I have lost everything, including honor.”61
Other evidence of Santa Fe citizens’ opinion exists. Lt. William H. Emory
wrote in his notes that Armijo “has long been suspected of wishing an excuse to
fly. It is well known he has been averse to a battle, but some of his people threatened his life if he refused to fight. . . . It is quite evident he fears the penalty
of his long misgovernment.”62 Another soldier wrote later that, “It is clear the
Mexicans here are very much discontented, and the further south you go, the
more this will become apparent.”63 These sources make evident the prevalence
of this opinion, particularly south of El Paso towards Chihuahua. It was a judgment that Armijo himself could not escape. On 12 October, Ruxton encountered Armijo on the road from Chihuahua to Durango. In their long discussion,
Armijo asked what Ruxton had heard from central Mexico about the happenings in Santa Fe. Ruxton recorded: “I told him that there was but one opinion
respecting it expressed all over the country—that General Armijo and the New
Mexicans were a pack of arrant cowards.”64
Armijo spoke in his own defense on a couple of occasions. In his first report
to Ugarte on 21 August, he again blamed the cowardice of his troops: “All the
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other soldiers have turned against me under the pretext which I will make
known to you when I see you.” He went on to state that the people of New Mexico were generally pro-U.S. These reasons contributed to his having to retreat
from Santa Fe.65 When he encountered Ruxton on 12 October Armijo justified
his decision on the basis that he did not have the men and munitions to mount
a proper defense: “They don’t know that I had but 75 men to fight 3000. What
could I do?” 66 Rafael Chacón, looking back with sixty years of experience, was
also generous in his assessment: “What could Armijo do with an undisciplined
army without any military training, without commissary resources, and without leaders to direct the men? He was a dwarf against a giant. Armijo was the
imaginary hero of that epoch. Had he rashly rushed to give battle, it would have
been equivalent to offer his troops as victims to the invading army; the result
would have been a useless effusion of blood, offering himself unnecessarily to
death.”67 A few weeks after the withdrawal from Apache Canyon, Armijo rhetorically asked the Minister of War and the Navy, “How could I have justified sacrificing uselessly the sixty valiant men who accompanied me? They could come
to this frontier . . . to swell the ranks of their brothers and sacrifice themselves if
necessary but with the honor and glory of the nation. These are the feelings in
my heart, proven by these facts: I abandoned my family and my interests, and
I refused with the dignity that my post demands the offenses of my enemies.”68
Armijo’s decision can hardly be faulted from a military perspective. It would
be hard to believe that he negligently abandoned his post. Rather, he appears to
have made a tactically prudent military decision. At the end of the day and whatever the cause, he had to face a U.S. force that he believed numbered around three
thousand.69 As noted in the variety of sources above, the number of Mexican men
Armijo actually commanded in his detachment and the militia is unclear. Prior
to Armijo’s arrival in Apache Canyon, estimates range from eighteen hundred to
ten thousand men, with most sources indicating it was perhaps two to four thousand in strength. However, his regular dragoons (i.e., the actual Mexican military
detachment) with which Armijo withdrew to the south numbered no more than
a couple hundred, possibly as few as sixty men according to Armijo, although it
benefits his own argument to say he had no soldiers with which to fight.70
Outnumbered, Armijo’s only advantage would have been his position. One
unnamed military official’s diary recorded, “The position they chose was near
the lower end [of the canyon], and it was one of great strength. The passage was
not more than forty feet wide. . . . It was thought by us that their position was
equal to 5000 men.” 71 U.S. soldier Abraham Robinson Johnston reported, “Had
Armijo’s heart been as stout as the walls of rock which nature gave him to aid
in defense of his country, we might have sought in vain to force this passage.”72
Emory was somewhat less generous in his analysis, suggesting that the placement
Saffell / A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of Santa Fe

295

would have briefly exposed U.S. Army soldiers to Mexican fire but they would
otherwise have easily overtaken it.73
Later events indicate this geographic position’s military power on the one
hand, and its weakness on the other hand. The Battle of Glorieta Pass in 1862
found the Confederate Army of New Mexico under Gen. H. H. Sibley occupying an area that included Armijo’s cannon position of 1846, with (coincidentally) U.S. military forces advancing into the canyon from the east. Although
the fighting was steady and the Confederates eventually carried the field of battle, the position’s weakness was exposed when Union troops led by Maj. John
Chivington circled around Glorieta Mesa and destroyed the Confederate supply
train. Had Armijo stayed and fought, a similar outcome might have occurred.
Holding out in the canyon, Emory suggested that Kearny likely would have sent
some of his troops, as the Union did, around south to circle back to Santa Fe via
Galisteo. Either way, Armijo could have found himself cut off, just like the Confederates sixteen years later.74
Withdrawing south to unite with the thousands of Mexican troops that
Armijo had been promised were coming from Chihuahua appears to be a very
rational decision. The place of battle would have been better chosen, and the
numbers more even. Armijo likely had no way of knowing that Ugarte himself
only had a few hundred men, so the confrontation that Armijo thought would
take place in central New Mexico never occurred. The evidence, however, suggests to military historians that Armijo probably made a strategic withdrawal
and would not have been guilty of “abandoning a post.” As for the possibility
of Armijo fleeing in the face of danger, it would be improper to apply today’s
standards of conduct. Historians should also question the impartiality of most
contemporary U.S. accounts about Armijo and his actions. It is clear that Mexicans from Chihuahua southward believed Armijo was a coward. If nuevomexicanos were of the same opinion, they did not hold it against him in the long
run. After the war Armijo returned to New Mexico, eventually settling on his
family’s lands near Lemitar. If the locals had any anger toward him, they could
easily have made life unsuitable for Armijo and caused him to leave; instead his
neighbors left him in peace. Although there were subsequent investigations in
Chihuahua of his conduct in 1849 and 1854, neither produced an indictment.
Armijo lived out his final years quietly as a farmer and small livestock producer,
dying in December 1853.75
Conclusions
Providing a thorough examination of several aspects of the bloodless conquest
of Santa Fe, this work does not represent a final judgment. Although Magoffin’s
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role has been overstated for many decades, the actual extent of his influence
remains unclear. A firm conclusion as to the character and conduct of Manuel
Armijo also requires further investigation. Perhaps yet-to-be-utilized resources
in Mexico, most likely from the trial documents of Manuel Armijo or the deposition and trial of James Wiley Magoffin, may yet yield further details and alter
historiographical interpretations of these events.76 Until those materials surface,
this article’s revised interpretation helps to better understand a critical moment
in New Mexico’s history.
This reexamination of the events of late summer 1846 in New Mexico makes
four major conclusions. First, much of the details and revised interpretation initially offered in the early twentieth century by Twitchell, Connelley, Drumm,
and others misconstrued the “newly discovered” documents. Aside from McAfee’s letter, those sources make no mention of Armijo and Magoffin somehow
being related. McAfee’s misstatement sent historians down a wrong path and
fundamentally changed the historical understanding of these men’s relationship. Furthermore, Magoffin’s request to be reimbursed for bribes he paid led
some historians to assume that if he bribed authorities in Chihuahua, he must
have done so in Santa Fe. That assumption, coupled with Armijo’s poor historical reputation, reinforced the conclusion that Armijo was a coward paid off
by the Unites States to avoid a fight. These early twentieth-century interpretive
errors occurred naturally in some respects, but deeper scholarly digging undermines many of their conclusions.
Second, Senator Benton’s memoirs were very powerful in setting the original narrative. Despite his direct connections to the key players, Benton’s account
is inconsistent with the interpretations of later historians. Benton likely would
have known if Armijo had been paid a bribe (by either Magoffin or the U.S.
Army), or that Magoffin was related by marriage to Armijo. He did not mention either of these details. That said, few historians have checked, questioned,
or contradicted Benton’s account of events. As mentioned above, Hubert Howe
Bancroft suggested in a footnote that the story was exaggerated, but he nevertheless utilized it as factual. Prior to the surfacing of Magoffin’s reimbursement
claims documents, Twitchell also used the Benton account verbatim.77 Only
Lansing Bloom, in an account in 1915 also published before the Magoffin claim
documents became widely available, declares the whole story as fabrication:
The present writer does not find tenable the generally accepted view that
Captain Cooke’s real mission to Santa Fe was to escort a secret agent of
the United States. H. H. Bancroft first elaborated this point, hinting very
broadly that both Armijo and his second in command, Juan Andrés
Archuleta, were bribed into not putting up any genuine resistance. There
is no denying that Bancroft gave color to his account by weaving James
Saffell / A Reexamination of the “Bloodless Conquest” of Santa Fe

297

Magoffin into it; but, as he himself admits, his sole basis for so doing was
the reminiscences of Senator Benton. . . . It seems nearer the truth to say
that the plausible Irishman blarneyed the United States Government out
of $30,000 for his losses sustained later in Chihuahua than that he prevailed on Armijo not to defend his Department.78
Only one other historian questioned the Benton rendering, calling attention to
the potential for bias on Benton’s part. William Connelley, who in 1907 published an account about Col. William Doniphan’s expedition and its role in the
U.S.-Mexico War, was one of the first historians who tried to track down additional documentation, including the Magoffin claims. Connelley corresponded
with James Wiley Magoffin’s son Joseph on several points and included Joseph’s
brief profile of his father in a footnote. Joseph’s comments that his father had
been a “secret agent” led Connelley to put enough stock in Benton’s account to
merit its inclusion, but he hoped that documents held by the War Department
or Kearny’s descendants would confirm the account.79
Connelley points out, however, that Benton was heavily prejudiced against
Kearny: “No more uncompromising man ever lived than Benton. No man
ever in American public life was more intolerant, and often he was, despite his
greatness, rash and unreasonable.” Additionally Connelley writes that Benton’s
son-in-law was Lt. Col. John C. Frémont. In January 1847, U.S. Navy Commodore Robert Stockton had appointed Frémont military governor of California, a
post that he refused to relinquish when Kearny arrived from Santa Fe with written orders from President Polk and Secretary Marcy that Kearny would serve as
governor of California. Frémont was eventually court-martialed and convicted
of mutiny, disobedience of a superior officer, and military misconduct. Benton fiercely defended Frémont and openly declared his hostility toward Kearny,
leading to a thirteen-day fight against Kearny’s promotion as brevet major
general in September 1848. There was no way that Benton was going to give
Kearny any credit in the New Mexico campaign, and Connelley agreed with
several of his correspondents that Benton’s bitterness toward Kearny had to be
acknowledged.80
Connelley hoped that the War Department documents, which he did not
obtain until several years later, would more definitively establish whether
Magoffin deserved the honors that Benton ascribed to him: “Should it prove to
be true, even then the services of General Kearny can never be considered the
less efficient and valuable.” Thus, Connelley’s conclusion in 1907 that Magoffin’s
role may have been significant, should not be to the detriment of the work done
by Kearny, whom Connelley stated “acted in the conquest of New Mexico with
promptness, energy, firmness, and intelligence.”81
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Connelley’s cautions provide a strong basis to question, if not discredit, the
veracity of the “bloodless conquest” of Santa Fe interpretations based on Benton’s memoir, which influences this analysis’s third conclusion about what the
other primary documents reveal. As outlined above, it seems at best that Magoffin only planted seeds of doubt in Armijo’s mind. He was not solely responsible
for the bloodless conquest of Santa Fe, regardless of anyone’s interpretation of
his actions after the war. It is critical to remember that in order to secure reimbursement for his claims, Magoffin had to demonstrate that he played a highly
significant role.
If Magoffin’s letter to Marcy on 26 August 1846 is any indication, he may
have successfully dissuaded Colonel Archuleta from opposing the United States’
annexation east of the Rio Grande, but it is unclear that he convinced Armijo
of anything. He may have been an influential voice, but Armijo obviously continued to prepare a defense at Apache Canyon as late as thirty-six hours before
Kearny’s advance troops arrived. Even in his own account, Magoffin claimed no
direct credit for any result.82 Indeed, had Magoffin’s letter been available to Connelley for his book in 1907, he would have found that Magoffin himself gave broad
credit to Kearny: “Genl. Kearny by his mild and persuasive manners has induced
the good people of New Mexico to believe that they now belong to the greatest
nation on earth, and that the stars and stripes which are now so gallantly waiving
over the capitol of this City will always give them ample protection from foreign
foes.”83 This statement leads to this article’s fourth conclusion: Kearny is not given
as much credit by historians for the successful conquest as he may be due.84
Many events in history are as complex as this story, but rarely do they get the
in-depth scrutiny that may be required. This reexamination demonstrates how
failures in primary source criticism and the casual acceptance of previous secondary accounts can perpetuate incorrect interpretations of historical events.
Scholarly rigor applied to the primary sources in this case provides a better historiographical accounting of the intrigue surrounding the events of August 1846
in New Mexico. When the legend fails to accord to fact, print accurate factual
analysis.
Notes
1. In the movie from 1962, after telling his story to newspaperman Maxwell Scott,
Sen. Ransom Stoddard inquires, “You’re not going to use the story, Mr. Scott?” Scott
responds, “No sir. This is the West, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence, directed by John Ford (Hollywood, Calif.: Paramount Pictures, 1962).
2. This article results from my research work for the Magoffin Home State Historic
Site in El Paso. Our main points of interest were to clarify whether Magoffin was actually
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related to Armijo and exactly what role he played in these events. Conclusively answering those questions required looking at every detail and source—including seeking Mexican records of Magoffin’s subsequent imprisonment and trial for cooperating with the
Americans. This process naturally led us to question whether Armijo’s actions were reasonable and responsible and made us confront the questions of his cowardice.
3. As a rule, Benton preferred peace to conflict, so he initially argued for further negotiations with Mexico rather than launching a military campaign. Once President Polk
decided to go to war, Benton quickly shifted gears to suggest plans for the quickest and
most effective means to execute the campaign. William Nisbet Chambers, Old Bullion
Benton: Senator From the West (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 305–12.
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